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William J. Prior, “Socrates Metaphysician”: Abstract
Gregory Vlastos’ interpretation of Socratic philosophy was based on three claims:
1) that there are two portraits of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues, and that these
two portraits are incompatible with, indeed antithetical to, each other;
2) that the portrait of Socrates in the elenctic dialogues is a description of the
historical Socrates; and
3), that this Socrates was exclusively a moral philosopher.
Vlastos’ claim to find the historical Socrates in the dialogues of Plato has been subject to
a good deal of criticism. In this presentation I focus on the third claim, and relate my
conclusions to the first. I argue, following R. E. Allen, that the Socrates of the elenctic
dialogues possesses a metaphysical theory, a theory of universals, and that Vlastos’
reasons for denying the status of metaphysician to Socrates are unconvincing. I further
argue that this links the Socrates of the elenctic dialogues with the Socrates of the later,
more constructive dialogues. I conclude that the differences between the two portraits are
less severe than Vlastos claimed. Both portraits may claim to be based to some degree on
the historical Socrates, but both also bear the stamp of Platonic authorship.

1

Socrates Metaphysician1
In 1991 Gregory Vlastos published Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. The
thesis of this book was the claim that we can find in the early dialogues of Plato, when
certain embarrassing passages have been excised, reinterpreted, or relegated to a
‘transitional’ period, the philosophy of the historical Socrates. Vlastos argued that there
were two portraits of Socrates in Plato’s works, which he labeled “SocratesE” and
“SocratesM,” for the Socrates of the early and middle dialogues, respectively. These two
Socrateses held antithetical views. As Vlastos put it,
in different sets of dialogues he pursues philosophies so different that they could
not have been depicted as cohabiting the same brain throughout unless it had been
the brain of a schizophrenic. They are so diverse in content and method that they
contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to
mention, beginning with Aristotle’s.2
Vlastos distinguished the views of the two Socrateses by means of ten theses.3 The most
important of these theses is the first, that SocratesE is exclusively a moral philosopher,
1

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Eastern Division meeting of the American

Philosophical Association in Philadelphia, PA, in December of 2002, as part of a symposium on “Socrates
after Vlastos.” I am grateful to my co-symposiasts, Hugh Benson and John Beversluis, and to our session
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Ancient Philosophy 27 (2004), 1-14. I am grateful to Peter Momtchiloff, philosophy editor of Oxford
University Press, for permission to post this manuscript version of the paper.
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while SocratesM presents theories in every area of philosophy.4 The large philosophical
issue that lies behind most of these theories is the theory of Forms, and Vlastos devotes
most of his attention is to the question whether the Socrates of the early dialogues held
any version of this theory.5 I shall concentrate on this question in most of the remainder
of this paper.
I shall not be concerned here with the question whether the Socrates of the early
Platonic dialogues is the historical Socrates. I shall examine instead the claims that
provides the primary intellectual support for that contention:
1) the claim that there are in the Platonic dialogues two Socrateses: the Socrates
of the early and the Socrates of the middle dialogues, and
2) the claim that SocratesE is exclusively a moral philosopher, and not a
metaphysician.
My own view, which I cannot defend in detail here, is different from Vlastos’s. I believe
that there are indeed two Socrateses in the Platonic dialogues, but that their relation is not
one that precludes their inhabiting a single brain or, as I would prefer, character. There is
the Socrates who practices elenctic argument on, and usually at the expense of, his
interlocutors, and who does not provide positive answers of his own to the questions he
discusses. Then there is the Socrates who presents positive answers in the course of
constructive argument with his interlocutors. These answers, I would suggest, are
4
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metaphysics, the third epistemology, the fourth psychology, the fifth mathematics, the seventh political
philosophy, the eighth love, the ninth religion, and the tenth method.
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reasonable answers to the questions raised by the first Socrates, and there is no reason
why the Socrates who raised those questions might not answer them in the way the
constructive Socrates does. In fact, the constructive arguments and views that Vlastos
associates with SocratesM emerge not in the middle dialogues, but in the elenctic
dialogues themselves. These dialogues are far from free of positive philosophical
positions. I believe, therefore, that there is no schizophrenia in the answers cohabiting the
same brain with the questions. The questions and the answers cohabited at least one
brain, that of Plato. They inhabit the brain of the character named “Socrates” in the
elenctic dialogues. So, for all we know, they might have cohabited the brain of the
historical Socrates.
Vlastos claims that the Socrates of the elenctic dialogues is purely a moral
philosopher. Now it could be argued that Socrates has a theory of the soul, a political
theory, a methodology, a theory of knowledge, and a philosophy of religion, and perhaps
other theories in other areas of philosophy, and is therefore much more than a moral
philosopher, however much those theories might be in the service of moral philosophy.
Hugh Benson has argued this with respect to Socrates’ epistemology and methodology.6 I
want to argue that Socrates is a metaphysician, an ontologist, with a theory of Forms. It is
important that I make the following point clear before proceeding. It will suffice to show
that SocratesE is more than a moral philosopher if we can show that he has a theory in
any area of philosophy other than moral philosophy. That theory, however, need not be
the same theory developed by Plato in the constructive dialogues of his middle period.
Any recognizable philosophical theory that can be attributed to Socrates will do.
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Vlastos might not have objected too strongly to the claim that Socrates has a
theory of political obedience in the Crito, for that theory is a moral theory of political
obedience. He might have argued that a Socratic theory of aesthetics is not a problem for
his thesis, so long as the theory is a moral theory of the kalon. If it turns out that a
metaphysical or epistemological theory, especially one that can be extended beyond the
bounds of ethics, can be plausibly attributed to Socrates, however, Vlastos’s claim that
Socrates is purely a moral philosopher will be proved false.
Vlastos made his claim in a rather misleading way. As he stated the contrast,
“SocratesM had a grandiose metaphysical theory of ‘separately existing’ Forms and of a
separable soul which learns by ‘recollecting’ pieces of its pre-natal fund of knowledge,”
whereas “SocratesE has no such theory.” This is misleading because it fails to distinguish
between the claim that SocratesE believed in the separately existing Forms of the middle
dialogues and the claim that he had no ontological theory at all. Moreover, Vlastos spent
a good percentage of the time he devoted to arguing that SocratesE is not an ontologist to
denying that he had the ontology of SocratesM. I will concede at the start that SocratesE
did not believe in separate Forms. Nor did Plato introduce the theory of Recollection
before the Meno. SocratesE was, however, committed to the existence of Forms, and I
think this point is demonstrable. The claim that there is a metaphysical theory of Forms in
the elenctic dialogues is of course not new. Reginald Allen made this claim in an article
and then in a book written approximately thirty years ago.7 I believe that the claims Allen
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made at that time are basically correct, and I shall defend them here against the critique
of Vlastos. Allen’s view remains today a minority one, however. The objections to it are
many and varied, though all of them, I believe, can be dealt with.
Allen distinguished eloquently between the middle period theory of Forms and
the theory he found in the early dialogues:
I have suggested that there is a theory of Forms in the early dialogues, and
that it involves a metaphysical claim. I have not suggested that it is the theory of
Forms—that theory of the choir of heaven and the furniture of earth found in the
Phaedo, Republic, and other middle dialogues. . . . The philosophy of the middle
dialogues is a nest of coupled contrasts: Being and Becoming, Appearance and
Reality, Permanence and Flux, Reason and Sense, Body and Soul, Flesh and the
Spirit. These contrasts are rooted in an ontology of two worlds, separated by a
gulf of deficiency. . . .
This is “separation,” and it is possible to fix with some certainty the kind
of separation it is. It assumes both that sensible instances of Forms are deficient
resemblances of Forms, and that they are less real than Forms. There is no trace of
either of these claims in early dialogues such as the Euthyphro.8
What remains when the idea of “separation” has been removed? As Aristotle saw,
a theory of universals. Aristotle describes Socrates as “seeking the universal” in the
ethical matters he investigated (Metaph. A.6, 987b3.) Aristotle connects this concern with
the Socratic quest for definition. Socrates “was seeking the essence,” he writes (Metaph.
N.4, 1078b23); but Socrates, he says, “did not make the universals or the definitions exist

8
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apart,” (1078b30) as the Platonists did. Thus, Allen and Aristotle seem to agree that a
theory of universal forms can be attributed to Socrates.
What is the textual evidence that supports this claim? Allen focuses on two
passages in the Euthyphro, 5c-d and 6d-e. These two passages contain one of the most
thorough discussions of Forms in the elenctic dialogues. Socrates asks Euthyphro
whether he believes there is a single idea or eidos of holiness that all holy things have in
common, by virtue of which they are holy, and he asks for an account of its nature so that
he can use it as a paradeigma for judging the holiness of allegedly holy acts. He
describes holiness and unholiness as opposite qualities, each with their own character or
form. Euthyphro agrees. The use of the terms eidos, idea and paradeigma prefigures the
vocabulary of the middle period theory of separate Forms. If this passage occurred in a
middle period dialogue, scholars would not hesitate to make use of that theory in
interpreting it. The credentials of the Euthyphro as an elenctic dialogue, however, are
beyond reproach. A proponent of the view Vlastos held cannot move it out of the elenctic
group and into the “transitional” or “middle” group of dialogues without depriving his
interpretation of all credibility.
As Allen notes, similar claims are made in other elenctic dialogues. He mentions
the Laches, Hippias Major, and Meno. I will discuss the Protagoras and Meno. In a
famous passage of the Protagoras, on which Vlastos wrote a famous paper,9 Socrates
asks Protagoras whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and the other virtues are
parts, and whether one who possesses one part must possess all the others. He elicits from

9
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Protagoras agreement that wisdom, courage, justice, temperance and holiness are all parts
of virtue. He raises the question whether these parts resemble each other, and he and
Protagoras disagree on the correct answer to that question. He elicits the unforced
agreement of Protagoras that one part of virtue, justice, exists and is just, and that another
part, holiness, exists and is holy. He accomplishes all of this in about a page of text
(329c-330d).
Now this passage surely contains an ontological theory of virtue. Virtue is said to
exist, and so do its parts. Such talk about parts and wholes in philosophical discussion is
characteristic of ontology, but the telling feature of the discussion is the existence claims
themselves. Moreover, one of the most perplexing formulae of the middle period theory
of Forms, the “F-ness is F” formula, is presented not once but twice in the passage.
Justice and holiness are said to be, in some sense, self-predicative. Now the correct
interpretation of this formula is in doubt; and, as I noted, Vlastos himself offered in a
famous paper, published in 1972, an unorthodox reading of it. I doubt that the “Pauline”
reading of the formula is correct, but the point I would make is this. Vlastos treated this
passage, correctly I believe, as ontologically significant, and he applied his reading of the
“F-ness is F” formula in a subsequent article to a dialogue whose ontological content
cannot be denied, the Sophist.10 I do not think it is unfair to say that Vlastos treated
Protagoras 329c-330d in 1969 as containing an ontology. A philosopher who presents
and defends an ontological theory of virtue in serious philosophical discussion may not
be correctly described as “purely a moral philosopher.”

10
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Now here one might be inclined to defend Vlastos by saying that, though the
theory is indeed an ontological one, it is confined to moral philosophy. Socrates presents
an ontological account of virtue and its parts, not a general theory of the characteristics of
things. Therefore, as in the case of political theory and aesthetics, Socrates still may be
said to be exclusively a moral philosopher. I believe that this defense miscarries, in two
respects. First, I would urge that an ontology of moral characteristics is nonetheless an
ontology, and that a philosopher who presents one, though he be presenting what Kant
called a “metaphysics of morals,” and not a general metaphysics, is nonetheless
presenting a metaphysics. Second, I would note that Plato portrays Socrates as extending
this theory in the second passage I want to discuss, in the Meno.
At the very beginning of the Meno, Socrates asks Meno to define virtue. When
Meno offers an account of many varieties of virtue, Socrates tries to make it clear what
he wants, by an analogy with bees: bees come in different kinds, but they all share an
essential nature as bees. Likewise, even if they are different in some respects, the virtues
share a common character that makes them all virtues. Just as health, size and strength
are the same in men and women, so virtue will be the same. (72b-73a) In this passage
Socrates invokes what Aristotle would call the substantial form or essence of a bee and
two non-moral characteristics of human beings and other biological species to elucidate
the idea that virtue is a form. Moreover, he uses, as in the Euthyphro, the distinctive
terminology of the theory of Forms to do so: he refers to the ousia of the bee, and asks of
it hoti pot’estin (72b1-2); and he says of the virtues that they have a single eidos in virtue
of which they are all virtues (c7-8; cf. d8, e5 on the eidē of health and strength). I do not
think it is plausible to claim that he uses these non-moral cases of a general characteristic
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merely for the sake of example, without being committed to the truth of the matter. Nor
do I think that it is possible to construe this passage as involving only linguistic
definitions of terms or concepts, rather than common characteristics. No, Socrates gets
Meno to admit that the nature of the bee and the qualities of health and strength are
genuine universal characteristics. One might cite other non-moral examples of common
characters, such as the definition of quickness offered in the Charmides, as well.
With the claim that there is an ontology in the elenctic dialogues, an ontology of
common characters, Vlastos does not disagree. How does he defend, then, the claim that
the Socrates of these dialogues is exclusively a moral philosopher? In different places he
says different things. In his 1988 British Academy lecture, “Socrates,” he writes
SE has forms, but no theory of forms He asks, “What is the form piety? What is
the form beauty? “What is form?” he never asks. His persistent “What is it?”
question sign-posts a moral inquiry into the definition of this or that form, never a
metaphysical inquiry into the nature of form as such. About the essence of each of
the forms he investigates he is often perplexed. Of their existence there is never a
doubt in his mind nor, be it noted, in that of his interlocutors: not one of them ever
contests it. And why should they? What he is talking about are forms existing
only ‘in’ their instances, never ‘separately’ from them.11
In this passage Vlastos makes several claims. The first is that the theory of
immanent characters in the elenctic dialogues is not a “theory.” I find this a difficult point
to deal with, because I have found in discussions with other scholars of ancient
philosophy no agreement as to what constitutes a theory. Julia Annas often puts the word

11
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“theory” is scare-quotes when discussing the middle period Platonic theory of separately
existing forms, to indicate her doubt as to whether Plato’s descriptions of these forms in
the middle dialogues constitutes a theory.12 I would say, with Vlastos, that the middle
period account of Forms is a theory if anything in ancient philosophy is, but perhaps I
should surrender the term “theory” until those who would deny it to Socrates explain
clearly what they mean by it. Instead, I would note that, according to the best known
criterion of ontological commitment in contemporary analytical philosophy, that of
Quine, the Socrates of the elenctic dialogues is clearly committed to an ontology of
common characters, for he makes existential claims about them: he treats them, in
Quine’s phrase, as values of bound variables. He says that justice exists, and piety, and
moreover he discusses their identity conditions: he says that these characters are one and
the same in every action they characterize, and he discusses their identity and nonidentity with each other.13
So far, however, Vlastos can again agree. His explanation in the passage quoted
above of the claim that Socrates has no theory of forms in the elenctic dialogues seems to
be that Socrates does not ask the “What is it?” question about them. Only a “metaphysical
inquiry into the nature of form as such” would justify the claim that Socrates had a
metaphysical theory. Unfortunately for Vlastos, this criterion would disqualify the middle
period theory of separately existing forms from its status as a theory, at least until the first
part of the Parmenides. It is true that he regards the Forms as an hypothesis in the
12
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Phaedo, and he does explore the implications of this hypothesis, especially with regard to
the issue of separation, but he does not ask the question “What is Form?” until the
Parmenides (if there), and his interlocutors show no more hesitation about affirming the
existence of separate Forms in the Phaedo and Republic than the interlocutors of the
elenctic dialogues do about affirming the existence of immanent characters.
In any event, however, the criterion is too restrictive. It is not necessary for
someone to ask a second-order question about the nature of an entity appealed to in the
presentation of a theory for that theory to be held in a reflective, philosophical manner.
Vlastos staked a lot on this point, but it cannot be correct. It is true that the “What is it?”
question is of central importance to Socratic investigation, but it is not true, not even for
Socrates but certainly not for other philosophers, that the only questions that give rise to
philosophical theorizing are questions of definition. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any
passage in the elenctic dialogues where Socrates makes the claim that only when he is
discussing definitional questions may we take him to be engaging in serious
philosophical theorizing.
Let us suppose, however, that Socrates held the view that Vlastos held on his
behalf: that only if Socrates asks the “What is it?” question about a subject can we say
that he is engaged in philosophical inquiry about that subject. Are we then entitled to say,
as Vlastos urged, that Socrates is not engaged in serious philosophical inquiry concerning
the nature of form in the elenctic dialogues? I would think not. For Vlastos admitted that
Socrates engages in serious philosophical inquiry about the nature of individual virtues,
such as courage and piety, and about virtue as a whole; and in the course of that inquiry
he states explicitly on occasion that the answer to the “What is it?” question must be, “a
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particular form.” Now the definitional statements that Socrates is looking for are identity
statements of some sort, and in an identity statement it does not matter whether the
definiendum or the definiens is on one side of the identity sign or the other. So if Socrates
engages in serious philosophical inquiry about the nature of piety, and the definition he
seeks is a definition of a form, he is engaging in serious philosophical inquiry into the
nature of that particular form. Socrates does not have to ask, “What is virtue?” or “What
is morality?” for a philosophical inquiry about courage or piety to be an inquiry about a
particular virtue and thus a moral inquiry. By parity of reasoning, he does not have to ask
“What is form?” for an inquiry about an individual virtue, which is described as a form,
to be a metaphysical or ontological inquiry. (In addition, since it is a view attributed to
Socrates that “virtue is knowledge,” Socrates does not have to ask, “What is knowledge?”
for his inquiry into the nature of virtue to be an epistemological inquiry.)
The point I am making is this. If a philosopher inquires into the nature of a
subject, and makes it clear that the answer to his inquiry must take a particular form, the
assumptions that characterize the answer, at least if the answer is an identity statement,
are as relevant to the character of the inquiry as the assumptions that shape the question.
When Socrates asks in the Laches “What is courage?” it may be clear at the outset only
that the inquiry is a moral one; but when Nicias answers that courage is knowledge of
good and evil the inquiry becomes not only moral but epistemological. When Socrates
asks in the Euthyphro “What is piety?” it may be clear at the outset only that the inquiry
is a moral, or perhaps only that it is a religious one; but when Socrates makes it clear to
Euthyphro that he is seeking an answer in terms of a common character, the inquiry
becomes metaphysical as well.

13

The assumption that the answer to the “What is it?” question must be a common
character is an assumption that characterizes Socratic inquiry in the elenctic dialogues
even when it is not explicitly stated. As Allen puts it, the requirement that the answer to a
Socratic inquiry into a virtue must specify a common form “play(s) a regulative role in
dialectic.”14 It substantively limits the kind of answer that can be given, just as the
assumption that inquiry must take the form of an elenctic examination methodologically
limits the form the inquiry may take. Indeed, a Socratic inquiry can hardly get off the
ground without this assumption. Repeatedly in the elenctic dialogues Socrates’
interlocutor attempts to answer his question about the nature of some virtue with an
example, only to have Socrates point out to him that this is not the kind of answer he
wants. It is often said that Socrates wants to limit the form a definition must take, but it
should be said that this is not merely a limitation in verbal format: the kind of definition
Socrates is seeking, as Allen again points out,15 is real definition, not nominal. The
ontology of forms in the elenctic dialogues is not an artifact of linguistic convention, a
by-product of the Greek way of forming abstract terms from adjectives or the like: it is a
genuine metaphysical theory and it does real philosophical work. If SocratesE is a moral
philosopher of the sort described in the elenctic dialogues, then, he cannot be exclusively
a moral philosopher, for his moral inquiry presupposes a metaphysical theory, a theory of

14
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common properties. Without this metaphysical underpinning, Socratic moral inquiry
cannot take place.16
Perhaps the most serious argument that Vlastos raises in defense of his view that
Socrates has no theory of forms in the elenctic dialogues is the argument that the claims
of this purported theory are too commonplace to merit the designation “theory.” In the
passage quoted above, he makes this claim when he states that his interlocutors never
express any doubts about the existence of common characters. In Socrates: Ironist and
Moral Philosopher, he makes the claim in this way:
[I]t is gratuitous to credit him, as has so often been done in the scholarly
literature, with a theory of forms. His belief in their reality is no more evidence of
his having such a theory than is the man in the street’s belief in the reality of
physical objects evidence of his having a theory of physical objects. A belief is
not a theory if everyone’s agreement with it can be presumed as a matter of
course – if it is unproblematic for everyone, in need of explanation and
justification for no one. This is the vein in which SE believes in the reality of
forms.17
I think this claim is seriously misleading in at least three respects. First, it is not
clear to me that the fact of widespread agreement disqualifies a claim from the status of a
theory. Everyone in the civilized world today would agree with the claim that the earth
16
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revolves around the sun, but that does not mean that this is not a theoretical claim, or that
the people who agree with it do not hold the Copernican, as opposed to the Ptolemaic,
theory of the solar system. The alternatives to an ontology of physical objects are not
widely accepted, but that does not mean that this ontology is not a theory, or that those
who accept the claim do not adhere, however unreflectively, to a theory. One way of
understanding the Socratic examination of his interlocutors on moral topics, a way that I
think is congenial to the account developed in Vlastos’ “The Socratic Elenchus,” is an
attempt to make the interlocutors aware of the theoretical, that is the philosophical, depth
and significance of the apparently ordinary, non-theoretical, non-philosophical statements
they are inclined, unreflectively, to make about moral matters.
Let us concede, however, if only for the sake of argument, that the unreflective
“man in the street” may not hold a theory, whether of moral virtue or of physical objects,
or of the solar system. To what is that fact, if it is a fact, due? I would argue that it is due
to the fact that the “man in the street” is not a philosopher or theoretician. When a
philosopher such as Socrates puts forth a claim, though, however innocent it may sound
to his interlocutors, it may very well be part of a philosophical theory. Again, that seems
to be a feature of Socratic examination: apparently innocent statements are elicited from
the interlocutor, then connected to produce, more often than not, a paradoxical claim,
such as that it is more harmful to the agent to do evil than to suffer it, or that courage is
the whole of virtue. According to my second response to Vlastos, then, it could be that
what makes a statement theoretical is not the statement itself but the character of the
person who makes it and the context in which it is made. “Physical objects exist,” in a
philosophical essay on ontology written by a professional philosopher, is a theoretical

16

claim, even if the claim is not theoretical when made by “the man in the street.” The
same goes, I would suggest, for “Piety is a form.” Socrates is simply not the unreflective
person some of his interlocutors may be, so the analogy between the way in which he
holds his views and the way in which they hold theirs breaks down.
Third and most important, Vlastos seriously misrepresents the degree to which the
ontological theory of common characters is uncontroversial. About this I would make
three claims. The first is that Socrates is careful to elicit the agreement of his interlocutors
about this ontology: he doesn’t simply foist it on them. He asks Protagoras whether he
believes justice is a single thing. Similarly with Hippias, and with Euthyphro. Apparently
Socrates thought that this was a matter important enough to secure agreement on before
proceding. The second is that the interlocutors, even after they have assented, often show
by their subsequent behavior that they do not understand the point they have agreed to.
Protagoras has no trouble grasping the point, but Hippias and Euthyphro find the idea of a
common character intellectually daunting, and it takes a good deal of subsequent
discussion to sort matters out. The third and most important point is that not all of the
interlocutors in the elenctic dialogues accept the idea of the common character. To be
specific, Meno does not. When Socrates finds that Meno does not understand his request
for a definition of virtue and offers the analogies of the nature of a bee and of health and
strength by way of clarification, Meno responds that he doesn’t think the case of virtue is
the same as those cases (73a). There follow some six Stephanos pages of tightly reasoned
discussion on the correct form for definitions to take, culminating in Meno’s famous
statement of perplexity and the subsequent challenge to Socrates to explain how anyone
can inquire into anything. This discussion is elicited by Meno’s demurral from the

17

Socratic claim that virtue is a common eidos with a single character. Clearly, in this
passage, this claim is not taken as requiring no explanation or justification.
At this point scholars may object that the Meno is not an early dialogue, and
therefore cannot be used to elucidate the ontology of the early dialogues. My reply is
twofold. First, for all we know, the Meno may be an early dialogue. We do not know
when in the sequence of dialogues it was written. Scholars tend to see it as later than the
other dialogues of the elenctic group because it contains a discussion of the doctrine of
recollection, but that is a distinction drawn on grounds of content rather than style, and in
this regard tendentious, because it presupposes the truth of the developmental picture of
Plato’s literary career. Second, and more important, the first third of the Meno is clearly
an elenctic dialogue, as Vlastos himself admits.18 Thus, this discussion of definition can
fairly be used to elucidate the ontology of the elenctic dialogues. In the elenctic
dialogues, then, the assumption of the existence of common characters to explain the
nature of virtue or the virtues is not always taken to be uncontroversial and in need of no
justification. In the Meno it is shown to need, and it gets, a good deal of justification. (I
would say the same of the passages in the Euthyphro that Allen discusses).
Scholars may also object that since the Meno contains the theory of recollection,
and since that theory is associated with the theory of separate forms of the middle
dialogues, the focus on method and ontological commitment is appropriate in a way it
would not have been in the earlier dialogues. This ignores an important, if obvious point.
The forms of the discussion in the first third of the Meno are not the transcendent entities
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“In the first third of this dialogue the elenchus has returned, alive and kicking.” Vlastos, “Socrates,” 144.
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of the Phaedo, Symposium and Republic, but the common characters of the Euthyphro
and other elenctic dialogues. There is no trace of separation in this passage.
The Socrates of the elenctic dialogues is a moral philosopher. The form his moral
philosophy took was that of inquiry into the nature of the moral virtues. The assumption
underlying this inquiry is that the virtues are characteristics, properties, common to many
individual persons and actions. Without this assumption, it is hard to see how Socratic
moral inquiry could go forward. The assumption is ontological, metaphysical in
character. The fact that it is held not casually but in the face of philosophical objections,
marks it as a philosophical view.
I conclude, then, that Vlastos was incorrect in his claim that the Socrates of the
early dialogues was exclusively a moral philosopher. I have argued, following Allen, that
the Socrates of these dialogues is a metaphysician, an ontologist, as well as a moral
philosopher. The ontology of the elenctic dialogues differs from that of the middle
dialogues only in a single respect: separation. This is a huge difference, and it is, strictly,
an incompatibility. Thus, the ontology of the elenctic dialogues is in this one respect
incompatible with the ontology of the middle dialogues. In other respects, however, it is
compatible with that ontology, and should be seen as the precursor or first stage of that
theory. In this regard, as, I believe, in others, SocratesE was much more closely connected
to SocratesM than Vlastos’ portrait allows.
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